AHRON SHAPIRO

IN Ramallah earlier this month, thousands of Palestinians rallied at the tomb of the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, in observance of the fifth anniversary of his death.

Amid the backdrop of the political troubles of his successor -– Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas -– the nationalistic spectacle raised the issue of leadership: Where are the Palestinian people today? Where are they going, and are they better off now than they were under Arafat, a figure who personified Palestinian national aspirations for nearly four decades?

Focusing solely on his post-Oslo era of leadership over the PA, Arafat was not a very good public servant by any measure. He was corrupt. He incited his people. He was a master at speaking out of both sides of his mouth – talking the language of peace to English audiences, while calling for jihad in Arabic.

He was accused of doing little to improve the lives of ordinary Palestinians, while he lived in palatial luxury on siphoned funds. He could be brutal with his internal adversaries, and kept a firm rein on power through a policy of intimidation and fear.

Be that as it may, many Palestinians look back at his leadership with nostalgia. Many Israelis do as well, principally because regardless of whether or not he was serious about making a lasting, permanent peace with them – as has been questioned by many a commentator – the power vacuum that followed his death in November 2004 has unquestionably diminished the prospects for peace based on a two-state solution.

At this point, had Abbas been reading this, he might have questioned whether he was “chopped liver”. It would have to be asked whether Abbas has been an ineffective and impotent peace partner compared to Arafat. Unfortunately, to answer the current PA President, the response to this question, no matter how you phrase or look at it, is yes.

Ironically, it may well be true that Abbas genuinely wants a lasting peace more than Arafat did. By all accounts, Abbas has been a more dependable head of government as far as international peace negotiators are concerned. Whereas Arafat had a fickle nature and was prone to erratic behaviour, Abbas is more even-tempered and diplomatic, especially when his political back isn’t to the wall, as it has so often been this season.

And yet, peace is still elusive. The reason for this is Abbas lacks something that Arafat had in spades: the power to stand up to any internal opposition to his decisions.

Abbas’ political weakness has been an underlying problem throughout his time in office. Arafat’s relationship with Hamas was complex – he was no friend of theirs, and many Hamas members were persecuted at the hands of Arafat’s henchmen. However, Arafat backed away from a complete purge so long as he could keep them away from the real seats of power, which he was able to do quite well.

Almost before Arafat was even buried though, Hamas – sensing the opening they were looking for – went to work exploiting Abbas’ weaknesses. The rise of Hamas, at Abbas’ and Fatah’s expense, continued unabated and culminated with its sweep of the Palestinian Legislative Council elections of January 2006 and Abbas’ subsequent total loss of control of Gaza to a Hamas military uprising in June 2007.

The loss of Gaza was a key blow to peace prospects, for no longer could Abbas claim to represent the entire Palestinian people. Abbas’ recent call for elections in January has the potential to bring this reality into greater focus, as Hamas has vowed to block any election in Gaza. Palestinian commentators have wryly observed that such an outcome would furnish or brand Abbas with the effective title of premier of the West Bank, and nothing more.

For the Israeli government, the idea of making a land-for-peace deal with a party that lacks the power to end the conflict on behalf of the entire Palestinian people is problematic. That they continue to attempt to negotiate with the PA, under the assumption that Hamas rulers based in Gaza and Damascus will go along with any peace deal agreed to by Abbas, is either very optimistic, or an act of wilful denial, depending on who you ask.

It is almost inconceivable that Arafat would have allowed Hamas to gain power the way that it has. Make no mistake – Hamas tried to challenge his authority while he was alive and was pushed back every time, sometimes brutally. Democracy be damned – by hook or by crook, Arafat would almost certainly have continued to keep Hamas in check.

Arafat would also never have bothered to futz around with setting preconditions for peace negotiations, the way Abbas has been doing. Abbas has clung to his demand for a total settlement freeze to prop up his image with his people. Arafat needed no such bolstering.

Arafat had no fear of negotiating with Israel. This was probably not because of any affinity he had with diplomacy, but because he knew if he did not like what he heard in the peace talks, he could simply resort to indirect violence in the form of organising activists to clash with Israeli soldiers, or perhaps ­turning a blind eye while Hamas unleashed a suicide bomber or two.

Indeed, this is what typified Arafat’s negotiating style from the late 1990s through to his self-initiated Second Intifada from late 2000.

While Arafat would likely have kept the Palestinians in a better position to negotiate peace than his successor, there are many spheres where Abbas has bettered his predecessor, none more significant than the economy.

It was Abbas, and not Arafat, who delivered a genuine revival of the economy of the West Bank, for the betterment of ordinary Palestinians.

Arafat’s regime, on the other hand, was involved in wholesale embezzlement. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) released a report in September 2003 that determined that $US900 million in revenues from 69 commercial enterprises belonging to the PA in the West Bank, Gaza and abroad, vanished between 1995 and 2000. This is just one report -– in all likelihood indicative of many others.

And it does not even take into account the outright misappropriation of international monetary aid during the same period, which has been well documented.

This system of graft helped strengthen Arafat’s grip, since he was able to control the flow of money in the Palestinian territories to his political allies.

Whether the credit goes to Abbas, PA Prime Minister Salaam Fayad or Mid-East Quartet envoy Tony Blair, the economic situation on the ground in the West Bank is an unheralded success story for ordinary Palestinians, the likes of which never occurred -– nor showed any signs of occurring -– under Arafat.

Whereas Arafat’s idea of economic development could be exemplified by a casino he opened in Jericho to raise money for his cronies, the West Bank is quickly becoming a haven of honest-to-goodness economic growth, and in the midst of a recession, no less.

A recent IMF report predicts the economy in the West Bank will expand by an additional two per cent this year to seven per cent, and the wealth from that growth is benefiting a wider swathe of Palestinians than it did under Arafat.

Are the Palestinians better off without Arafat? It’s a complicated question. As an ideologue and an iconic figure, nobody represented the Palestinian national aspirations better than Arafat. For all his faults, had he agreed to a final status peace agreement with Israel during his lifetime, there is little doubt that he would have had the power to enforce it.

There is no Palestinian leader today that we can say that about with the same degree of certainty. That is why, no matter how many problems Israelis and Palestinians had with Arafat while he was alive, life without Arafat has become, and in the foreseeable future will remain, far more unpredictable.

Ahron Shapiro is the AJN’s world editor.